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1Introduction 
by  MAT ThEW A.  ROSENSTEIN
This issue of Swords and Ploughshares examines the 
complex set of global security challenges that are 
emerging as a result of warmer temperatures and 
melting ice in the Arctic region. Several developments 
in the past few years have heightened awareness 
about the prospects for international conflict and 
cooperation in the Arctic. Reports of newly navigable 
waters due to openings in the Arctic sea ice, and of 
scientific research chronicling the upward trend in air 
and ocean temperatures and potential large stores of 
untapped oil and gas in the region, triggered media 
coverage about a possible future “race for resources.” 
The planting of the Russian flag on the seabed of 
the North Pole in summer 2007 sparked concerns 
among North American and European policymak-
ers and military strategists about Russian intentions. 
This increased attention was followed by a series of 
strategic policy documents and press releases from the 
Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States—and other 
relevant nations, international bodies, security orga-
nizations, and indigenous groups wishing to stake 
their positions and assert their rights and interests in 
the region.
For policymakers and analysts alike, the contem-
porary Arctic presents a particularly acute conver-
gence of compelling problems and opportunities 
related to global security, foreign affairs, climate 
change, environmentalism, international law, energy 
economics, and the rights of indigenous populations. 
The goals of this publication are two-fold: to provide 
thoughtful analysis of recent developments in the 
Arctic both from scientific and geopolitical perspec-
tives; and to offer careful and informed assessments of 
how evolving conditions in the Arctic might impact 
the broader global security framework and relations 
between the international actors involved, not to 
mention the region’s inhabitants and ecosystem.
The articles in this issue were contributed by each 
of four panelists invited by the Program in Arms 
Control, Disarmament, and International Security 
(ACDIS), the European Union Center, and the 
Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center at 
the University of Illinois to participate in a Novem-
ber 2009 symposium entitled “Global Security, 
Climate Change, and the Arctic: Implications of an 
Open Northwest Passage.” The symposium and this 
publication were supported through grants to the 
host centers from the European Commission, the 
US Department of Education (Title VI international 
education program), and the John D. and Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation.
In the first article, William Chapman summarizes 
the consensus findings of the scientific community 
regarding trends in Arctic warming, sea ice coverage, 
and sea ice thickness. his article provides useful con-
textual background for the discussion in subsequent 
articles of geopolitical considerations in the Arctic. 
Chapman gives the reader glimpses of a large store of 
information culled from various tools: historical and 
contemporary temperature readings, sea ice coverage 
comparisons captured by satellite images, and sea ice 
thickness measurements by sonar instruments and 
onboard satellite platforms. At one point, he presents 
data about summer Arctic sea ice coverage gathered 
from over a dozen different international research 
computer models. It is noteworthy not only that 
those studies indicate measurable sea ice loss, but also 
that the observed reduction in sea ice coverage in the 
past few decades has outpaced the models’ predic-
tions. While Chapman cautions that the models 
cannot promise, for instance, accurate forecasts as to 
when sea ice might recede completely in a given loca-
tion, or exact coordinates for navigable transit routes, 
nevertheless the trends clearly point to longer Arctic 
navigation seasons in the future, which may in turn 
lead to increased commercial shipping and resource 
exploitation opportunities.
In the next article, Klaus Dodds asserts that 
the climatological changes described by Chapman 
are indeed translating into the “acceleration and 
intensification” of access to the Arctic, the use of its 
resources, and associated challenges and problems in 
areas such as security, governance, and environmen-
tal management. Dodds draws particular attention 
to law of the sea issues. he describes the territorial 
claims and ongoing outer continental shelf mapping 
efforts by coastal states. he also conveys how 
increased accessibility and interest in the region may 
conspire to introduce additional contingencies, such 
as prospects for further militarization of the Arctic, 
and heightened sovereignty concerns of coastal states 
that might accompany the rising volume of maritime 
traffic. Taken together, these issues beg further ques-
tions about governance of the Arctic, and whether 
existing legal frameworks and venues for stakeholder 
discussion are sufficiently developed, yet also flexible 
2enough to adapt to rapidly shifting conditions. 
Dodds concludes his article with the provocative 
insight that the dynamic process of framing the 
Arctic as a place is becoming increasingly complex, 
reflecting competing and overlapping visions of what 
the Arctic represents for diverse stakeholders.
In the third article, Ingrid Lundestad discusses US 
security policy in the Arctic, as well as US relations 
with other state actors as they pertain to the Arctic. 
Lundestad begins by briefly tracing the historical 
course of US Arctic policy, recounting how during 
the Cold War, Arctic affairs—like many aspects 
of international security—were viewed primarily 
through the prism of the US-Soviet rivalry. As global 
security dynamics began to shift near the end of 
the 20th century, US interest in the Arctic waned. 
however, near the end of George W. Bush’s second 
term in January 2009, the White house issued a 
presidential directive on national security and home-
land security reasserting US presence in the Arctic. 
The document was informed by traditional aspects 
of US Arctic policy, but also framed by new security 
imperatives and changed economic and environmen-
tal circumstances. Lundestad proceeds to describe 
current US priorities in the Arctic, and analyzes 
how US policies interact with those of Russia and 
the Nordic countries. She notes that US attention 
to the Arctic remains modest given the country’s 
multifaceted security agenda. Lundestad also asserts 
that, sensational media reports notwithstanding, the 
region offers more opportunities for US cooperation 
with Russia and others than it does possible points of 
confrontation.
Michael Byers concludes this publication with 
a discussion of what the future might hold for the 
Arctic. he touches upon interlinked issues with 
respect to climate change, commercial activities, 
security, international law, international institu-
tions, and indigenous peoples. In the process, Byers 
introduces additional subjects worth monitoring as 
further changes unfold in the Arctic: specific envi-
ronmental risks from marine shipping; the growth 
of eco-tourism; multinational coordination of search 
and rescue missions; international agreement on 
shipping guidelines; non-state security threats; and 
advocacy leadership by transnational indigenous 
peoples’ movements (such as the Inuit Circumpo-
lar Council) for the environment and the rights of 
traditional inhabitants of a given locale to be involved 
in nation-state sovereignty disputes. Byers closes with 
a sobering warning that excitement over Arctic oil 
and gas should not obscure the dangers of continued 
dependency on fossil fuels.
Although the four articles presented here treat a 
wide range of issues and undoubtedly the authors’ 
views diverge on some specific points, one can discern 
certain shared conclusions. First, the contributors 
launch their discussions from the basic premise that 
the Arctic climate is changing quickly. The more 
penetrating and likely more interesting set of ques-
tions that follow regard where the ice is melting; 
which type of ice is melting; when it is melting; to 
what extent will it enable increased transit; and what 
the impacts might be on the inhabitants of the region, 
the countries with the means and interest in tapping 
resources there, and the globe’s overall security, 
climate, and economic systems. Second, the authors 
who have written about geopolitical and foreign 
policy issues in this publication tend to agree that 
cooperation in the Arctic is more likely than conflict. 
More specifically, they find that the lone dispute over 
land territory in the Arctic is minor and manage-
able; that coastal states are following agreed upon 
protocols to pursue continental shelf claims, and are 
working constructively with each other in cases where 
there are overlapping claims; and that the existing 
international legal regime, while complex and still 
evolving, should enable cooperative governance of the 
Arctic. Finally, the contributors to this issue clearly 
agree that ongoing emphasis needs to be placed on 
addressing the rights and needs of indigenous peoples 
in the Arctic region, minimizing negative ecological 
impacts, and reducing points of contention among 
states. If such precepts are heeded, then the Arctic of 
the future may very well offer more cause for opti-
mism than alarm.
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4Short Takes
The world’s arctic and sub-arctic areas which we use and occupy transcend political 
boundaries.
—Charter of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, adopted 31 July 1998
The costs of climate change are already being paid by the peoples and communities of 
the Arctic.
—Achim Steiner, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 10 April 2007
[The existing legal] framework provides a solid foundation for responsible 
management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national 
implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to 
develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.
—The Ilulissat Declaration, statement from the five Arctic coastal states, 28 May 2008
The main problems relating to Arctic governance include the fragmentation of the 
legal framework, the lack of effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-
setting process and gaps in participation, implementation and geographic scope.
—“The European Union and the Arctic Region,” Communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
European Parliament and the Council, 20 November 2008
Our first and main task is to turn the Arctic into a resource base for Russia in the 
21st century. Using these resources will guarantee energy security for Russia as a 
whole.
—President Dmitry Medvedev, address to Russian Security Council, 17 September 2008
5The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the 
Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with 
other states to safeguard these interests.
—US Presidential Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 9 January 2009
Canada is an Arctic nation and an Arctic power…the Arctic and the North make 
up more than 40 percent of our land mass and are home to more than 100,000 
Canadians, many of them Inuit and First Nations members whose ancestors have 
inhabited the region for millennia.
—Lawrence Cannon, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing the release of the Government of Canada’s Northern 
Strategy, 26 July 2009
Only when the ice breaks will you truly know who is your friend and who is your 
enemy.
—Inuit proverb
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 Sea ice has been both a 
blessing and a curse to Arctic 
nations, providing protection 
along their northern borders 
from enemy naval threats, 
while at the same time inhib-
iting trade and commerce.
 Recent climate change in 
the Arctic has brought about 
the prospect of navigation 
interests exploiting the 
Northern Sea Route and 
Northwest Passage.
Arctic Climate Change: Recent 
and Projected
by  WILLIAM L.  ChAPMAN
The Arctic is entombed in darkness for a large part 
of the year. Even in summer when the sun hovers 
just above the Arctic horizon for much of the day, 
the oblique sun angles ensure only modest amounts 
of sunlight are absorbed at the surface. The lack of 
solar energy throughout the year allows the region 
to release its energy to space without replenishment. 
The resulting frigid air temperatures in the Arctic are 
sufficient to freeze salt-laden seawater at the surface of 
the Arctic Ocean and peripheral seas. This sea ice has 
been both a blessing and a curse to Arctic nations, 
providing protection along their northern borders 
from enemy naval threats, while at the same time 
inhibiting trade and commerce along those same sea 
routes.
 But climate change is threatening to alter this 
picture in significant ways. While global surface air 
temperatures have increased about +0.8°C over the 
past century, air temperatures in the Arctic have 
increased at more than twice this rate (+1.8°C) over 
this same period. Arctic warming has implications 
for many other climate variables. Snow cover has 
decreased over Northern hemisphere landmasses, 
altering agricultural schedules and practices. Perma-
frost is degrading in large parts of the Arctic with 
implications for infrastructure and construction 
hazards in the region. Glaciers have been receding in 
most countries, forcing changes in water resource use 
and reservoir policies. But the most important change 
related to global commerce and security has been the 
associated decrease in extent of sea ice cover in the 
Arctic Ocean.
 Arctic sea ice area reaches its maximum extent 
in March of each year and melts back to about half 
the maximum area in September. The summer melt 
season exposes a small fraction of the Arctic Ocean, 
Figure 1 Observed seasonal minima of sea ice coverage in the Arctic.
7 Summer sea ice coverage 
and sea ice thickness in the 
Arctic have decreased by 
approximately 40% over the 
most recent several decades.
 Global climate models 
project Arctic temperatures 
to warm 2.5° to 5°C in the 
case of the early greenhouse 
gas mitigation scenario and 
4.5° to 8°C in the business-
as-usual scenario.
Figure 2 September Northern Hemisphere sea ice coverage.
but for most of recorded history the summer melt 
has not been sufficient to enable safe navigation of 
the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. 
A navigable Northern Sea Route would save almost 
half the shipping time and resources of the tradi-
tional shipping route south of Asia via the Suez 
Canal. Similar savings are gained when navigating 
the Northwest Passage along the northern coast of 
North America instead of the southern trek via the 
Panama Canal. Recent climate change in the Arctic 
has brought about the prospect of navigation interests 
exploiting these shortened routes. 
Recent Climate Change in the Arctic
Seasonal minima of sea ice in the Arctic have declined 
about 40% over the past several decades (Figure 1). 
September sea ice covered a little more than 5.25 
million square kilometers of the Northern hemi-
sphere in the late 1970s and has shrunk to less than 
3 million square kilometers in 2007. Recently, 2008 
and 2009 saw slightly higher sea ice coverage, but still 
below the long-term trend line causing the 30-year 
trend to decrease even more from the previous years 
(accelerating sea ice loss).
 Figure 2 shows the September Northern hemi-
sphere sea ice coverage for the first three years of 
the satellite era (1979–1981) and the most recent 
three years of the satellite record (2007–2009). The 
fraction of sea ice at a given location is color-coded 
so that the purples indicate near complete cover-
age of sea ice (90–100%) and the yellows and reds 
correspond to 50% coverage or less. While there has 
been notable loss of sea ice in the North Atlantic 
sector of the Arctic, the majority of the sea ice loss in 
the Arctic has been on the Pacific side where sea ice is 
typically thinnest.
 Sea ice grows and melts with changes in near 
surface air and ocean temperatures, but it also 
responds to the surface winds, and to a lesser extent, 
the surface ocean currents. Sea ice drifts around the 
Arctic Ocean in response to surface winds. Drift 
speeds are typically centimeters per second, but can 
get much higher when strong Arctic storms blow. The 
frequent storms entering the Arctic from the North 
Atlantic and the relative lack of storminess north of 
Alaska result in a climatological pattern of ice drift 
that is generally away from the Siberian coast, north 
across the pole, and toward Greenland and Canada’s 
north coast. The resulting convergence of sea ice 
against the north coast of Greenland and Canada 
causes compaction of the sea ice, strengthening and 
thickening it by creating compression and pressure 
ridges. Thus, sea ice is typically older and 3–5 meters 
thick in this region and only 1–2 meters thick along 
the north coast of Siberia.
 The harsh conditions of the Arctic make direct 
observations of sea ice thickness difficult. As a result, 
historic thickness data are sparse in both space and 
time. What few direct observations we have include 
point-source measurements from occasional Arctic 
field programs and limited declassified sea ice draft 
observations from upward-looking sonar instruments 
8mounted onboard military submarine cruises under 
the sea ice. Only recently has progress been made in 
obtaining remotely sensed sea ice thickness measure-
ments from instruments onboard satellite platforms. 
Still, these limited thickness data reveal a pattern 
of sea ice loss very consistent with that seen in the 
coverage data. For the Arctic Ocean as a whole, sea 
ice thickness has decreased by approximately 40% for 
co-located observations over the most recent several 
decades.
 Accelerating sea ice loss in recent years has 
provided new opportunities for navigation via both 
the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. 
The Northern Sea Route has been open to navigation 
for at least one and as much as eight weeks for three 
of the past four years. The Northwest Passage has 
a southern route and a more expeditious northerly 
path through the straits of the Canadian Archipelago. 
The northern route of the Northwest Passage was 
navigable for a few weeks for the first time in the sea 
ice record in 2007 (Figure 3). The southern route of 
the Northwest Passage was navigable for several weeks 
for three of the past four years.
Projected Climate Change in the Arctic
While it is impossible to know the exact changes in 
store for the Arctic climate over the coming decades, 
computer models can be used to simulate potential 
climate change due to increasing greenhouse gases. 
Global climate models are constructed by portraying 
the laws of physics governing the air, sea, land, and 
ice as computer code to be processed at hundreds of 
thousands of grid points comprising a virtual earth. 
The performance of these global climate models in 
simulating recent observed climate has improved 
markedly over the past two decades. Basic variables 
such as temperature and pressure are well simulated 
by most global climate models, so that the simulated 
biases from observations are small. Secondary param-
eterized quantities like precipitation and cloud cover 
show general similarities to observations, but the 
details in many cases are not perfect. Nevertheless, 
these models represent the state-of-the-art in project-
ing global climate change.
 As stipulated by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), modeling centers from 
around the world simulate future climate with 
three different scenarios of greenhouse gases. These 
scenarios vary from aggressive replacement of fossil 
fuel consumption with renewable energy options in 
the next few decades, to a business-as-usual scenario 
that continues to inject greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere at the current rates into the next century.
 The global climate models respond to these 
widely varying scenarios of greenhouse gas increases 
with corresponding ranges of warming rates. Global 
climate models project Arctic temperatures to warm 
2.5° to 5°C in the case of the early greenhouse gas 
mitigation scenario and 4.5° to 8°C in the business-
as-usual scenario. The spatial pattern of the warming 
looks very similar to the observed warming of recent 
decades, with high latitude land masses warming the 
most, and tropical and ocean regions warming the 
least. In all scenarios and all models, the warming 
is largest in the Arctic and sea ice loss is a primary 
factor.  
 The reasons for this enhanced Arctic warming are 
directly related to the importance of sea ice in the 
earth’s climate system. Sea ice, and more specifically 
snow-covered sea ice, is a highly reflective surface 
 Several climate models 
project reduction of the sea 
ice by about half, while in 
the remainder the majority of 
the sea ice will be melted by 
the end of this century.
 It is noteworthy that the 
observed sea ice loss for the 
recent past has outpaced 
the loss projected by all the 
global climate models forced 
with increased greenhouse 
gas concentrations during 
the same period.
Figure 3 The northern route of the Northwest Passage was navigable for a few weeks for the first time in the sea 
ice record in 2007.
9(high albedo), especially compared to a relatively 
dark ocean (low albedo). When the planet warms 
slightly, some sea ice is lost. A reduction in sea ice 
exposes more open ocean to the sun’s rays during the 
Arctic summer. Additional sunlight is absorbed in the 
absence of sea ice during the long summer days. The 
additional energy absorbed by the oceans will warm 
the ocean surface and the air above it. The result-
ing increase in ocean and air temperatures will melt 
even more sea ice, completing an ice-albedo positive 
feedback loop. This positive feedback mechanism 
is one of the primary driving factors for enhanced 
Arctic warming in an environment with increased 
greenhouse gas concentrations.
 While the ice-albedo feedback is not a factor in 
winter, the loss of sea ice still plays an important 
roll in Arctic warming. Normally, sea ice acts as an 
insulator between the bitter cold winter air tempera-
tures and the relatively warm underlying ocean. A 
loss of winter sea ice removes some of this insulating 
layer and exposes the cold Arctic air masses to vast 
amounts of energy (and moisture) from the warmer 
ocean surface. Climatological winter temperatures 
can vary by more than 10°C depending on the pres-
ence or lack of sea ice: warmer without sea ice, colder 
with ice.
 Throughout recorded history transportation via 
the Arctic Ocean has been limited by the existence 
of a near continuous and impenetrable sea ice cover. 
The potential for future navigability in the Northern 
Sea Route and the Northwest Passage depends on 
the projected changes of summertime sea ice extent 
in the Arctic. Figure 4 shows simulations for the 
past century and projections for the 21st century 
of September sea ice extent in the Northern hemi-
sphere obtained from output from thirteen global 
climate models. In all cases the global climate models 
project sea ice loss over the two centuries. A handful 
of models reduce the sea ice by about half and the 
remainder melt the majority of the sea ice by the end 
of this century. It is important to note that both the 
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are 
already near the southern limit of the summertime 
sea ice. Thus, any additional loss of sea ice from this 
point forward will result in dependably navigable pas-
sageways and extend the navigation season propor-
tional to the sea ice loss.
 The series showing the observed sea ice loss for the 
past three decades is superimposed in red on Figure 4. 
It is noteworthy that the observed sea ice loss for the 
recent past has outpaced the loss projected by all the 
global climate models forced with increased green-
house gas concentrations during the same period. 
This could point to deficiencies in the global climate 
models—that is, the sea ice loss may not be sensitive 
enough to changes in greenhouse gases. Alternatively, 
 As the sea ice melts in the 
coming decades, the thinner 
areas of the Northern Sea 
Route (north of Siberia) will 
likely make it—as opposed 
to the Northwest Passage 
and its thicker sea ice—the 
first of the major Arctic 
routes to open for navigation 
for extended periods.
Figure 4 Simulations and projections by thirteen separate global climate models for September sea ice extent in 
the Arctic. The red line indicates observed data.
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the recent observed sea ice loss may be an extreme 
case of natural variability. It is this author’s opinion 
that the former is much more likely.
 While there is broad agreement in the future 
projections of Arctic climate and sea ice extent, it is 
prudent to outline the inherent uncertainties. First, 
the climate models are imperfect. But, there is likely 
sufficient skill to make the kind of qualitative assess-
ments asserted here. Second, a range of projections 
needs to be considered since the human factors and 
response to increasing greenhouse gases are largely 
unknown. Finally, when assessing the potential 
for regionally specific changes (such as navigation 
through specific straits and passages), the coarse 
climate models may not have sufficient detail in their 
resolution or parameterizations to accurately depict 
these changes. Thus, we are limited to generalized 
conclusions with the current state-of-the-art.
Implications for Navigation
These broad-brush hemispheric sea ice projections 
can be tailored to more specific navigation outlooks 
by applying reasoning relating to the climatological 
spatial pattern of geographic ice thickness. Realizing 
that the younger, thinner ice is typically found along 
the north coast of Siberia and the older, thicker ice 
is typically found along the north coast of Canada, 
we can infer that as the sea ice melts in the coming 
decades, the thinner areas of the Northern Sea Route 
(north of Siberia) will likely be the first of the major 
Arctic routes to open for navigation for extended 
periods. The proximity of the Northwest Passage to 
a source region of older, stronger and much thicker 
sea ice makes predicting future Northwest Passage 
navigability a riskier proposition. While much of 
the Northwest Passage is surrounded by land masses 
and may, in fact, warm more than the Northern Sea 
Route, the remaining thick ice north of the Cana-
dian Archipelago will pose a perennial risk for thick 
sea ice drifting south into and around the Canadian 
Archipelago at the whim of anomalous and persis-
tent weather patterns, especially those favoring a 
strong southerly wind regime. The implications to 
navigation interests are that the predictability for a 
Northwest Passage open to navigation is not as high 
as the Northern Sea Route. Even if probabilities are 
high for an open Northwest Passage in a given year, 
close monitoring of week-to-week weather patterns 
will be required due to the uncertainty of the near-
term weather patterns and potential for hazards to 
rapidly develop.
 Nevertheless, we have developed projections of 
navigability of the Northern Sea Route for the rest 
of this century. Navigation depends not only on the 
amount of sea ice in the region, but also on the ice 
capabilities of the vessel. For vessels with little ice 
strengthening, navigation can presently be expected 
for 2-3 weeks on an average. By mid-century, the 
navigation season is expected to grow to 4-5 weeks 
and by the end of this century, the navigation season 
for non-strengthened vessels is projected to be 
almost three months. For vessels that have had some 
strengthening of their hulls to successfully navigate in 
thin ice conditions, the current navigation season is 
about three weeks. By mid-century projected naviga-
tion season for these vessels increases to ten weeks 
and by the end of this century, to four months.
 Similar increases to length of the navigation 
season can be expected for the Northwest Passage. 
however, as stated earlier the reliability of these 
projections is subject to more short-term weather 
fluctuations. Weekly and even daily weather and sea 
ice monitoring will be an essential component to 
successful navigation of the Northwest Passage, even 
under the most extreme climate change scenarios. 
Still, the recent climate changes experienced in the 
Arctic, and those expected to accelerate in the coming 
decades, are providing unique opportunities for navi-
gation and commerce and unprecedented challenges 
to communities and nations bordering this pristine 
environment.
William Chapman is a research scientist in the Depart-
ment of Atmospheric Sciences at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research is focused 
on climate processes and climate change in the Polar 
Regions. His work entails analyzing many sources of 
cryospheric data from observations and model output. 
Chapman is currently investigating recent and projected 
changes in surface air temperatures and sea ice over the 
Arctic and Antarctic. Additionally, he has been looking 
into errors and biases of Global Climate Model (GCM) 
simulations of the Polar Regions. He is becoming increas-
ingly interested in novel ways to disseminate scientific 
results to interested public and policy makers. A portal to 
many of the results of Chapman’s research can be accessed 
at http://arctic.atmos.uiuc.edu/.
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In January 2009, NATO representatives held a 
meeting in Iceland to consider the future security 
challenges pertaining to a thawing Arctic. For much 
of the Cold War, the presence of thick pack ice in 
the high North had offered a proverbial security 
blanket—traversing the ice was possible both above 
and below but it generally involved nuclear-powered 
icebreakers and nuclear submarines. Soviet, Ameri-
can and British submarines, for example, travelled 
under the polar ice-pack during the Cold War and 
contemporary hollywood films such as Ice Station 
Zebra conveyed well the difficulties involved in 
navigating the shifting patterns of ice distribution. 
Understanding ice dynamics was a major priority 
during the Cold War not only in terms of detect-
ing enemy movements but also in enabling NATO 
craft to avoid detection, especially when involved 
in covert surveillance operations. NATO’s strategic 
planning for the Arctic was premised on the presence 
of ice—detecting and avoiding icebergs, ice cover and 
implications for sonar and navigation.
In recent years, earth scientists have warned that 
sea ice cover in the Arctic is thinning. In September 
2007, dramatic satellite imagery was released showing 
that the fabled Northwest Passage was open for a 
short period of time in the summer season. In Sep-
tember 2009, it was reported that two German cargo 
ships had traversed the Northern Sea Route (NSR), as 
they departed from South Korea and travelled along 
the Russian coastline to their eventual port of call in 
Rotterdam. The two ships were able to complete the 
journey because of a reduction in sea ice cover. The 
use of the NSR is significant—it cuts 4,000 nauti-
cal miles off the standard 11,000 mile voyage via the 
Suez Canal. It yields substantial savings in time and 
fuel costs. It also, as a direct consequence, reduces 
the carbon footprint of shipping. With the permis-
sion of the Russian authorities, this transit was also 
noteworthy because in the past very few non-Russian 
commercial vessels have actually used this route. In 
part the NSR was impassable because of the presence 
of sea ice, but passage has also been restricted due to 
the fact that the NSR has been considered to be a 
highly strategic sensitive zone.  
Sea ice thinning combined with enhanced acces-
sibility of the Arctic formed the core area of concern 
for the NATO meeting—and it is worth remember-
ing that four out of the five Arctic coastal states are 
NATO members—Canada, Denmark, Norway and 
the United States. The specter of an ice-free Arctic 
might on the one hand offer advantages but on the 
other hand, it also poses challenges and even dangers. 
Avoiding the kind of media sensationalism that has 
predicted conflict and bedlam in the near future, 
what is needed is a more sober assessment of the 
contemporary Arctic, which is nonetheless mindful 
of the fact that bio-physical changes in the region are 
ongoing and do pose serious challenges to indigenous 
communities, to energy companies, to Arctic coastal 
states, to security organizations and other users and 
interested parties. It does, moreover, pose questions 
about how the region is governed and whether exist-
ing bodies such as the Arctic Council are sufficiently 
robust and dextrous to address a changing high 
North. 
A Changing Arctic: Acceleration 
and Intensification 
Sea ice thinning and the prospect of an ice-free Arctic 
in the next couple of decades underwrite much of 
the contemporary discussion about the strategic 
significance of the region. With the loss of a natural 
barrier, it is widely feared that the Arctic will become 
increasingly accessible and exploited, with attendant 
implications for peace and security not to mention 
global environmental change. It is worth bearing in 
mind that the Arctic has not always been as isolated 
from “southerly” developments as this characteriza-
tion might imply. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, for instance, whalers and sealers were 
highly active in exploiting living resources and the 
Arctic was tied into national, regional and global 
economies. Trading networks existed between and 
beyond the Arctic, as the hudson Bay Trading 
Company typified. Oil and gas companies, in the 
1960s onwards, also ensured that energy related net-
works of drilling rigs, pipelines and logistical support 
likewise occupied the Arctic landscape and seascape. 
Moreover, in more recent times, the diffusion of long-
range pollutants has also illustrated only too well the 
impact of industrial development for a region largely 
removed from centers of mass production and energy 
consumption. 
So what has changed is better thought of as 
examples of acceleration and intensification. After all, 
the presence of sea ice was a sufficient deterrent in 
the late 1960s when the problematic voyage of the SS 
Manhattan persuaded energy companies that it made 
better sense to develop a pipeline network in Alaska 
rather than rely on ships to transport hydrocarbons 
to overseas markets. Arctic coastal states such as 
Canada, while mindful of voyages by the Manhattan 
through the Northwest Passage, are now considerably 
more concerned about the implications of an acces-
sible Arctic and the manner in which other opera-
tors might seek to traverse through their “internal 
waters.” This is a contested issue, as other countries 
including the United States consider the Northwest 
From Frozen Desert to Maritime 
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 Understanding Arctic 
ice dynamics was a major 
priority during the Cold War 
not only in terms of detecting 
enemy movements but also 
in enabling NATO craft to 
avoid detection, especially 
when involved in covert 
surveillance operations.
 It is worth remember-
ing that four out of the five 
Arctic coastal states are 
NATO members—Canada, 
Denmark, Norway and the 
United States.
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Passage to be an international strait, where the rights 
of innocent passage prevail. So thinning ice will 
accelerate anxieties and indeed possible conflict over 
access rights and in particular strategically sensitive 
maritime passages in the north-west and north-east of 
the high North. 
With greater access so, it is feared (by some at 
least) will come more intense use of resources with 
consequent implications for Arctic ecosystems. One 
recent event more than anything else can be cited 
to symbolize this concern over intensification. The 
planting of the Russian flag on the bottom of the 
central Arctic Ocean in the summer of 2007 was 
widely interpreted as a sign of things to come. In 
part, this act only mattered because domestic and 
international audiences saw it. Outside of Russia, the 
dominant interpretation was that this was indicative 
of Russian spatial expansionism and domination of 
place. Russia, so the image suggested, was advertising 
its territorial ambitions to take over the central Arctic 
Ocean for its own benefit. A large number of media 
reports subsequently adopted the frame of “scramble 
for resources” to issue portentous warnings about the 
region becoming a scene of discord. So in this sense 
intensification refers not only to conflict potential but 
also that there would be further exploitation of the 
Arctic. 
This notion of the Arctic as an underground 
treasure trove awaiting exploitation was given further 
credence by the release in 2008 of the US Geological 
Survey’s Circum-Polar Resource Evaluation survey, 
which produced a report and some striking maps 
detailing undiscovered oil and gas potential. It was 
not the first to draw attention to this potential but 
it nonetheless showed clearly that the vast majority 
of hydrocarbon possibility resides within continental 
shelf areas and that most of the reserves are projected 
to be located in less than 500 meters of water. The 
USGS estimate that there might be, for instance, 
anywhere between 40 billion to 160 billion barrels of 
oil in the high North. The vast majority of undis-
covered gas potential lies off the Russian coastline 
but the survey suggests that hydrocarbon potential 
off the coastlines of Greenland is noteworthy. These 
estimates are just that—they do not, for example, 
take into account technical difficulties and it is highly 
possible that much of this potential may not actually 
be exploited. Most analysts of the oil and gas industry 
would caution anyone thinking that exploitation of 
these resources is likely to occur in the near future. 
While energy companies are interested, the operating 
conditions in the Arctic are difficult and it may well 
be that a period of 20–30 years would be necessary 
for exploitation of new fields. 
however, what is clear is that the prospect of oil 
and gas potential in the Arctic has provoked a series 
of activities and debates—much of it ongoing. Two 
areas are worth highlighting. The first revolves around 
the law of the sea and outer continental shelf claims. 
The Russian flag planting exercise, while of no inter-
national legal significance, coincided with ongoing 
attempts to map the central Arctic Ocean. Under 
Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, signatories such as Russia (but not 
the United States, which has yet to ratify the agree-
ment) have an opportunity to submit a report to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), which contains evidence that there are outer 
continental shelf areas relevant to particular coastal 
states and their existing exclusive economic zones. In 
essence, Article 76 provides a mechanism for coastal 
states to expand their resource rights over the ocean 
floor providing they demonstrate to the satisfaction 
of the CLCS that there is a geological and oceano-
graphic case for support. This is a time consuming 
and expensive process. Mapping and delimiting 
the ocean floor is not straightforward and critically 
evidence has to be presented, which supports the 
claim that there is indeed an outer continental shelf. 
In 2001, Russia made a submission to the CLCS and 
claimed a substantial part of the Arctic Ocean as part 
of its outer continental shelf. The CLCS, composed 
of geologists, oceanographers and geophysicists, 
reviewed the submission and deferred judgement. 
They asked for further evidence and the 2007 
expedition to the Arctic Ocean (which led to the 
flag planting) was designed to gather more evidence. 
Other coastal states in the Arctic such as Canada 
and Denmark are also collecting evidence for their 
outer continental shelf submissions, while Norway 
has already received and adopted the findings of the 
CLCS followings its submission in 2006. 
The issue of outer continental shelf delimitation 
is complex but not insubstantial. All five coastal 
states in the Arctic have expressed a desire to submit 
evidence in due course to the CLCS, even the non-
signatory United States. If accepted, it would mean 
that coastal states could extend their resource rights 
by another 150 nautical miles from the maximum 
extent of their exclusive economic zone. Depending 
on the recommendations of the CLCS, the legal and 
political geography of the Arctic Ocean will change 
as outer continental shelves are established and 
potentially areas of deep seabed proclaimed if they 
reside outside outer continental shelf zones. If there 
are areas of deep seabed then the resources therein 
become part of the common heritage of the global 
community and administered by the International 
Seabed Authority. What some observers fear is that 
Russia is trying to claim a sizeable expanse of outer 
continental shelf and if successful then it would have 
enhanced resource rights. however, the CLCS has 
not received any revised submission from Russia so 
it is highly premature to assume that the business of 
outer continental shelf definition has been finalized. 
 The planting of the 
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 Indigenous com-
munities are as divided 
about resource develop-
ment as more southerly 
constituencies.
 All five Arctic coastal 
states have produced in 
recent years new strategies 
for their northern territories.
 The Arctic Council, 
established in 1996, remains 
the primary mechanism for 
regional governance.
Discussing the resource potential of the Arctic 
has also proven provocative in another key area and 
that involves indigenous populations. One thing 
to be clear on is that indigenous communities are 
as divided about resource development as more 
southerly constituencies. The ongoing consultation 
and public reaction to the Mackenzie Gas Project 
in Northern Canada is indicative of a diversity 
of opinion. Native peoples have spoken power-
fully about the realities of traditional life based on 
hunting, fishing and trapping. Some have welcomed 
the possibility of new revenue streams while others 
fear that it will further undermine the fragile ways of 
life. The lengthy consultation process has also drawn 
attention to existing rights and duties in legislation 
such as Canada’s Constitution Act of 1982. The even-
tual exploitation of gas in the region will ultimately 
be shaped as much by regulatory delay as it will by 
prevailing gas prices and market conditions. Else-
where in the Arctic, the prospect of energy resources 
off the coastline of Greenland has stimulated debates 
about future independence from Denmark. In 
November 2008, 75% of the country’s electorate 
voted for greater autonomy and some Greenlanders 
believe that new revenue streams from oil and gas 
will provide the financial nourishment for eventual 
independence. 
The Greenland example reminds us that while 
some countries (e.g. Canada) and organizations 
(e.g. NATO) may worry about an ice-free Arctic, 
for others it offers opportunities both onshore and 
offshore. For the moment, the Arctic is in the midst 
of an interregnum as actors and organizations debate 
the implications of something that has not yet 
happened—the disappearance of the ice in the worst-
case scenario. As with Cold War nuclear planning, 
much of the assessments and investments in futurol-
ogy are predicated on the assumption that the ice will 
present less of a barrier to human activity, and that 
for the moment the melting and thinning processes 
are exposing new challenges from infrastructural 
instabilities to enhanced resource exploitation in areas 
such as oil, gas and fishing, not to forget other activi-
ties such as tourism, mining and timber harvesting.
Finally, the militarization of the Arctic also needs 
to be noted here as an example of acceleration and 
intensification of activity. All five coastal states have 
produced in recent years new strategies for their 
northern territories. Canada, for instance, issued a 
Northern Strategy and the current harper govern-
ment has made much of its commitment to extend 
the military presence in the Canadian archipelago. In 
the final days of the George W. Bush administration, 
the US released a presidential directive that reaf-
firmed the significance of the region for the country 
and linked homeland security to resource develop-
ment, sustainability and accessibility. It also urged 
the US Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea. In Russia, 
the Security Council drafted a new strategy that reaf-
firmed the determination of the country to establish 
a new military unit designed to protect the country’s 
Arctic territory—onshore and offshore. The ice-
breaking fleet is to be upgraded, over-flight patrolling 
stepped up and enhanced investment in mapping 
and surveillance of the Russian Arctic enacted. All 
the Arctic coastal states are concerned, even preoccu-
pied, with the implications for their sovereignty if the 
region becomes more accessible due to diminishing 
ice cover. 
Governing the Arctic
The Arctic is a very different kind of place to the Ant-
arctic, and unlike the polar continent, there does not 
exist an over-arching treaty (1959 Antarctic Treaty) to 
govern the high North. For much of the Cold War, 
it was a highly militarized space, which was patrolled 
and surveyed above and below the waters of the 
Arctic Ocean. Both NATO and Russia prepared and 
planned for possible military operations in and out of 
the Arctic. With the ending of the Cold War, Russian 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev raised the 
possibility in 1987 of the Arctic being transformed 
into a zone of peace. Thereafter, a series of initiatives 
(e.g. 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy) 
were launched with the expressed aim of improving 
co-operation between the neighbouring coastal states 
and the proximate countries of Finland, Iceland and 
Sweden. The most notable of these initiatives was the 
establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, which 
remains the primary mechanism for regional gov-
ernance. The remit of the Arctic Council is circum-
scribed—it does not consider military/security issues 
and it does not possess any legislative authority. It is 
an inter-governmental forum, which recognises the 
presence of indigenous communities as permanent 
participants (e.g. Inuit Circumpolar Council) and a 
series of observers including Britain, China, South 
Korea and Germany. With its five working groups, 
the Arctic Council has produced a series of important 
assessments and declarations pertaining to climate 
change, development, resources, pollution and moni-
toring and assessment of the regions’ ecosystems. 
In the last few years, however, the governance of 
the Arctic has become more complex and controver-
sial. The five coastal states, sensing the changing gov-
ernance dynamics, issued in May 2008 the Ilulissat 
Declaration reaffirming their role as primary guard-
ians of the high North and their commitment to the 
Law of the Sea as the mechanism for resolving any 
outstanding overlapping claims to the Arctic Ocean. 
The declaration did create friction between the five 
coastal states and other permanent participants of the 
Arctic Council, with Finland, Iceland and Sweden 
expressing concerns about their exclusion. The Ilulis-
sat Declaration clearly does pose a challenge to the 
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Arctic Council and the latter’s role in promoting 
oceanic management and environmental protection. 
The Inuit Circumpolar Council also expressed their 
reservations about the 2008 declaration and noted 
that issues such as living resource management and 
the evolving security policies of Arctic coastal states 
have implications for indigenous peoples and their 
livelihoods. 
In October 2008, the European Parliament 
considered the interests of the EU in the Arctic and 
noted that three member states have substantial 
engagements (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) while 
another two (Iceland and Norway) are close partners 
through the European Economic Agreement. While 
Greenland is not a member of the EU, this regional 
organization has become increasingly active in pro-
moting an Arctic policy. The European Parliament 
not only reaffirmed interests including navigational, 
energy and fishing interests but also proposed an 
alternative model of governance. Rather than pro-
moting a Law of the Sea approach, it was suggested 
that a new governance structure might be developed, 
which was more inclusive and less dependent on 
geographical proximity to the Arctic. In other words, 
looking to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the question 
was posed as to whether the Arctic might not have a 
remit and membership structure that gives little to 
no significance to whether a state is coastal or non-
coastal. The European Commission has been tasked 
with further developing the EU’s Arctic policy and 
this might include requesting observer status on the 
Arctic Council for example. 
Extra-territorial countries such as Britain, China 
and South Korea have also expressed increased inter-
est in the Arctic, citing climate change, shipping and 
energy security as national interests. China’s growing 
polar science program is noteworthy as Chinese 
scientists now routinely travel to both Polar Regions 
in order to carry out research into sea ice change and 
global warming. South Korea and the Port Authority 
of Singapore are examples of how both state and non-
state actors have expressed interest in the possibility 
of the Arctic emerging as a transit hub in the next 
two decades. These actors alongside others will put 
further pressure on the Arctic Council, which is not a 
treaty-based organization as mentioned earlier. There 
is no sign either that the permanent participants wish 
to develop, for instance, an Arctic Treaty inspired 
by some kind of hybridized version of the Antarctic 
Treaty. It may well be that other governance regimes 
including the Law of the Sea gradually undermine 
the efficacy of the Arctic Council even if it has been 
pioneering in some regards, especially in terms of 
ensuring representation for indigenous communities 
within an inter-governmental forum. 
Conclusion
Global environmental change with the specific pros-
pect of a seasonably ice-free Arctic is transforming the 
question of governance. Interest has been renewed in 
Arctic energy resources, fishing, shipping lanes and 
navigation and tourism not to forget the long-term 
sustainability of indigenous communities. Over the 
next twenty years, a variety of actors and institutions 
ranging from the EU to NATO to China will chal-
lenge the legal and geopolitical status quo pertain-
ing to the Arctic. Depending on the stakeholders 
concerned, different framings of the Arctic are 
being mobilized from “imperilled home” to “transit 
zone”—a “northern Mediterranean” to “common her-
itage” and finally “maritime domain.” Each framing 
carries with it specific understandings of the Arctic as 
a place. There is not just one Arctic, there are several. 
Over the coming decades, we will witness compet-
ing evaluations of resources, accessibility, governance 
and security. Ongoing debates pertaining to marine 
governance exemplify this trend—as coastal and non-
coastal states mobilize different visions of the Arctic 
as a zone of conflict and co-operation. 
Futurology is always a difficult and danger-
ous business. While skeptical of some of the more 
dystopian visions of conflict, the reality is that the 
governance of the Arctic is going to become more 
complex and that it is extremely unlikely that the five 
coastal states are going to have it all their own way. As 
the claimant states in the Antarctic discovered in the 
late 1950s, it is sometimes better to engage in new 
governance arrangements when a spirit of goodwill 
prevails. 
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Since 2006, the Arctic states have issued individual 
policy statements and strategy documents on the 
Arctic region. These announcements represent and 
reflect a growing interest in the region, as the Arctic 
icecap is retreating, opening up to increased pres-
ence and new types of activity in the north. While 
the United States has had a limited interest in Arctic 
affairs since the end of the Cold War, it has recently 
started to put the region on the agenda. An Arctic 
Region Policy was signed by the then outgoing Bush 
administration in January 2009, and the Obama 
administration has indicated that it will follow up on 
this policy, emphasizing Arctic cooperation. 
 In this article, we will explore US security policy 
and regional relations in the north. The article 
addresses the evolution of US security policy in the 
Arctic, and moves on to discuss present US security 
priorities, focusing on both traditional priorities 
as well as newer elements related to the changing 
environment in the north. Next, we will examine 
US regional relations, centering on Russian security 
policy while also including a brief overview of the 
regional approaches of the Nordic countries. Lastly, 
the article indicates how future US priorities and 
relations in the Arctic may become interlinked with 
broader foreign policy goals of President Obama.
 The article deals with the broader circumpolar 
approach of the United States, and especially US 
regional relations with the Arctic states mentioned 
above. It does not address issues specific to North 
American Arctic affairs. In the article, the Arctic 
is defined as the areas north of the Arctic Circle, 
although Iceland is included as it is generally consid-
ered an Arctic state. 
The Evolution of US Security Policy in the Arctic
In the Cold War setting, Arctic affairs were to a large 
extent perceived as part of the Cold War rivalry, the 
region being the area in which the two superpowers 
geographically faced each other. The three non-
superpower Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark 
and Norway—became members of the American-led 
NATO alliance from its onset in 1949. The United 
States set up bases in the north, most importantly in 
Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Iceland, as another 
element in its global strategy to contain the Soviet 
Union. With the Reagan administration’s efforts 
to more actively confront the Soviet Union in the 
maritime domain in the early 1980s, the northern 
dimension’s relevance to US policy increased. 
 As the Cold War came to an end, the attention 
given to the north became reduced. With the thawing 
of East-West relations, low tension in the area meant 
that the United States and others did not see the 
region as urgently important. Some cooperation 
came into place, especially as the Arctic Council was 
established in 1996 as a forum to deal with issues of 
environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment in the north. In terms of security policy, defense 
cooperation on the handling of nuclear material from 
the now former Soviet Union was a most central 
feature. 
 Nonetheless, in the period from the early 1990s 
to the start of the 21st century, the United States 
showed relatively little interest in developments in the 
Arctic, despite it continuing to be the most powerful 
state in the world and one of the five Arctic coastal 
states. In the search for a new strategic agenda in 
the post-Cold War era, the Arctic had no vital place 
in US policy. While the region had global relevance 
in the superpower conflict, the region was only in 
limited ways part of broader American strategic 
thinking once the Russians no longer were perceived 
as a threat to US interests or allies.  
 however, late in the Bush presidency, the admin-
istration decided that it needed to update its Arctic 
policy, which had last been reviewed by the Clinton 
administration in 1994. The stated background for 
this policy evaluation were the developments during 
the preceding decade and a half in national policies 
on homeland security and defense, as well as the 
effects of climate change and increasing human activ-
ity in the region. Awareness of the energy potential 
of the region and the establishment of forums for 
regional cooperation were also stated as elements 
influencing the need for a policy review. In addi-
tion, it may be added that the increased attention 
given to the region by other actors, most importantly 
as shown through Russian statements and actions, 
contributed to put the region on the multifaceted 
American agenda. The resulting outcome was the 
announcement of the National Security Presidential 
Directive-66/homeland Security Presidential Direc-
tive-25 on Arctic Region Policy of January 9, 2009. 
In the document, the Bush administration declared 
that the United States has both broad and fundamen-
tal national security interests, as well as fundamental 
homeland security interests, in the Arctic region. 
Present US Security Priorities in the Arctic
US Arctic policy as presented in the directive 
addresses several interconnected issues. To concen-
trate on the security policy dimension, the direc-
tive, as indicated, specifically addresses national and 
homeland security issues in the region. In addition, 
it deals with issues of governance, continental shelf 
and boundary issues, scientific cooperation, maritime 
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transportation, economic issues (including energy), 
as well as environmental protection and conservation, 
which all have security implications to a greater or 
lesser degree. But what exactly are the security priori-
ties of the United States in the Arctic? 
 Some priorities represent continuous interests that 
are not directly related to the physical changes taking 
place in the region. These include the fundamental 
interest of the United States in the freedom of the 
seas, navigation and overflight, as well as other priori-
ties such as missile defense and early warning and 
regional deployments of sea and air systems. Another 
element of continuity in the Arctic is the uncertainty 
related to relations with Russia. We will return to 
Russian Arctic policy below, but it suffices to say here 
that a fundamental and continuous security priority 
of the United States is of course also to secure a stable 
and peaceful international environment in the north.
 While these security priorities are more traditional 
or continuous in nature, others are linked to the 
climatic changes in the Arctic. homeland security 
represents one element in this. Considering increased 
activity in the region as the Arctic is warming, US 
policy will have to aim at preventing criminal activity, 
if not terrorist attacks, also in this region. having 
improved search and rescue capabilities to ensure the 
safety of activity in the region is one central dimen-
sion of this process, especially keeping in mind the 
limited infrastructure available to handle both poten-
tial accidents or crimes.  
 Furthermore, energy security has been an impor-
tant factor to the increased American interest in the 
Arctic. According to the most recent energy statistics 
of the US government, the Arctic holds an estimated 
22 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural 
gas, and the retreating Arctic ice cap means that 
these resources are getting more accessible. here, the 
United States has as its priority to define the Arctic 
areas in which the United States may exercise sover-
eign rights over natural resources. In line with this 
priority, both the Bush and Obama administrations 
have favored US accession to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea as the most effective way to 
achieve international recognition and legal certainty 
for US rights in the exclusive economic zones and on 
the extended continental shelf. 
 Lastly, while energy has attracted a lot of atten-
tion, the environmental challenges related to climate 
change and more human activity in the north are 
also increasingly being recognized within the United 
States, as elsewhere. The balance between seeing the 
region in terms of prospects for increased energy 
security, and in terms of securing the Arctic environ-
ment, is gradually becoming a more central part of 
US priorities in the north. 
US Regional Relations: Russia 
and the Nordic Countries
To turn to the Arctic regional relations of the United 
States, we need to look at the policies of some of the 
actors that the United States has to deal with in the 
north. First, we will look at Russia, which has gained 
the most attention of the Arctic states in the last 
few years. Next, we will briefly discuss the regional 
approaches of the Nordic countries.
 Some structural factors underpin the importance 
of Russia in Arctic regional affairs. The Russians have 
a substantial military presence in the north, primarily 
located in the Kola Peninsula, in Northwest Russia. 
With its geography, Russia is also the largest Arctic 
nation, with an Arctic shore line stretching from 
Europe to the Bering Strait. Within the Russian con-
tinental shelf, we also find the largest share of Arctic 
petroleum resources. 
 Most importantly, though, in terms of generat-
ing attention, Russian statements on the Arctic have 
had a somewhat confrontational nature, as part of 
a broader Russian self-assertiveness within the last 
decade. Symbolic actions, such as the restart of 
strategic bomber flights close to the territory of other 
Arctic states, and the planting of the Russian flag on 
the sea bed of the North Pole in summer 2007, have 
contributed to media controversy as well as uncer-
tainty in terms of Russian intentions in the north. 
 however, the Russians have at the same time 
shown a more pragmatic and cooperative attitude. 
It participates in Arctic cooperation in the Arctic 
Council, and it refers its territorial claims within the 
framework put forward by the Law of the Sea. Russia 
also signed the Ilulissat declaration of 2008, where 
the five Arctic coastal states underlined cooperation 
as the way to deal with recent and future challenges 
in the region, and stated that they did not see the 
need for any new specific comprehensive legal regime 
to govern the Arctic. 
 Of the Nordic countries, it is Norway that to the 
greatest extent has been occupied with Arctic issues in 
recent years. The Norwegian government has stated 
that what it calls the high North, usually referring to 
the European component of the Arctic, is Norway’s 
strategically most important region. Norway has 
consequently tried to raise international awareness 
of Arctic affairs, especially through dialogues with 
central actors such as the United States, and it has 
emphasized cooperation in the north, particularly 
with respect to neighboring Russia. Within NATO it 
has also argued in favor of putting more emphasis on 
alliance core functions. Trying to rebalance NATO’s 
missions at home and abroad, the Norwegian initia-
tive aimed to ensure that while the organization since 
the end of the Cold War has performed “out of area,” 
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NATO continues to plan for more traditional tasks 
in providing stability and security within the Euro-
Atlantic region. By putting emphasis on maintain-
ing the security responsibilities in and close to the 
member countries’ territories, the European, and 
also the North American, component of the Arctic 
might experience increased allied attention. At the 
same time, more southern members of the alliance 
may emphasize security needs within areas close to 
their territories, not to mention that the “out of area” 
missions—most importantly the NATO engagement 
in Afghanistan—remain a most central focus of the 
alliance.
 Denmark is the second Nordic country that 
is among the five Arctic coastal states, through 
Greenland as a self-governing part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark. In light of a warming and more accessible 
Arctic, the Danes have also proposed their own Arctic 
strategy, dealing with the broader circumpolar issues 
as well as cooperation between mainland Denmark 
and Greenland. Sweden, Finland and Iceland are also 
Arctic states, although they do not have shore lines 
in the Arctic. Together with the Arctic coastal states, 
they participate in the Arctic Council, and have 
experienced increased attention towards the north 
in recent years. however, of the five Nordic coun-
tries, it is Norway, and to some extent Iceland, that 
really emphasize Arctic issues in their foreign policy 
outlooks. To Iceland, the US 2006 withdrawal from 
the Keflavik base was a noteworthy shift. As Russian 
bomber flights have performed regular Arctic patrols 
since then, other NATO allies, among them the 
United Kingdom, France and Norway, have stepped 
up their activity to support Icelandic display of sover-
eignty in the north.  
US Arctic Policy and Regional 
Relations into the Future
The United States has signaled a renewed interest 
in the Arctic in the last few years. It emphasizes the 
need for a more active and influential presence than 
what has been the case since the end of the Cold War. 
At the same time, the US is dealing with a global 
agenda, in which the Arctic is not perceived as acutely 
important. This means that the US interest in the 
region still is somewhat limited, but that the region 
is part of the multifaceted agenda of the world’s only 
superpower. 
 however, at present, modest US interest in the 
Arctic also indicates that the state of Arctic regional 
relations is largely uncontroversial. While the 
increased attention given the Arctic in the last few 
years has brought with it considerable alarmism as 
regards the potential for confrontation in the region, 
there is good reason to believe that Arctic relations 
will remain largely cooperative. There are areas of 
dispute, but at the same time, the Arctic states, 
including Russia, do participate in Arctic coopera-
tion. The United States and the other Arctic states 
have little to gain from upsetting a stable environ-
ment in the north. Rather, Arctic challenges are most 
likely to appear in the “soft” security field, where acci-
dents or transnational crimes may represent central 
challenges, as the region is being exposed to increased 
human activity. These challenges, however, are best 
handled through cooperation between the Arctic, and 
also non-Arctic, states. 
Lastly, the Obama administration has signaled that 
it may combine broader, and perhaps even global, 
foreign policy goals with its Arctic policy. In this 
respect, the administration’s intention to ”reset” rela-
tions with Russia has led administration officials to 
state that the Arctic is one region in which the United 
States may form a functioning cooperative relation-
ship with Russia. This may be indicative of the future 
of both the US approach to and regional relations 
in the north. Such an initiative also brings about a 
US interest in Arctic affairs in which the region has 
relevance beyond local or regional affairs. In the Cold 
War, Arctic issues became strategically important 
to the United States in a broader sense as they were 
perceived as part of the global American objective of 
containing the Soviet Union. While there is currently 
little reason to believe that a generic framework such 
as that of the Cold War will manifest to tightly link 
the region’s importance to US global relations, there 
are elements contributing to the continued interest 
in Arctic affairs in the future that also transcend the 
local or regional level. A more substantial interest in 
American-Russian cooperation represents a central 
element in this, but also the increasing attention 
given to cooperation to limit and deal with the 
consequences of climate change may contribute to 
maintain an American, as well as international, focus 
on the north.
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The Arctic, located directly between the United 
States and Soviet Union, was on the front lines of the 
Cold War. Nuclear submarines prowled the Arctic 
Ocean while bombers circled on standby overhead. 
Runways and radar stations were built, along with 
underwater acoustic sensors.
A more cooperative approach has emerged since 
1990, when the United States and Soviet Union 
agreed on the location of their maritime bound-
ary in the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea. In 1996, 
the creation of the Arctic Council institutionalized 
cooperation on non-military matters among the eight 
Arctic countries: Russia, the United States (Alaska), 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Iceland, 
Sweden and Finland.
In the past decade, the cooperation has intensi-
fied because of climate change, which is melting the 
Arctic sea-ice, opening shipping routes, and facilitat-
ing access to oil and gas. As a result, unresolved mari-
time boundary disputes have acquired new relevance. 
In May 2008, the five countries that border on the 
Arctic Ocean (Russia, the United States, Canada, 
Denmark and Norway) adopted the Ilulissat Declara-
tion in which they reaffirmed their commitment to 
working within an existing framework of interna-
tional law to delimit their respective areas of sea-bed 
jurisdiction.
The Cold War divide has not been as easy to 
bridge on security matters. NATO has been expanded 
to include several countries bordering on Russia, 
while the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) has been extended to include 
the sharing of maritime surveillance between Canada 
and the United States. That said, the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 provided an impetus for some 
forms of security cooperation between NATO coun-
tries and Russia, notably the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, which applies to oceans everywhere. Recent 
improvements in U.S.-Russia relations, especially 
with respect to missile defense, nuclear non-prolifera-
tion and disarmament, could have major implications 
for circumpolar politics.
Climate Change
Climate change is more apparent in the Arctic than 
anywhere else. Change is being driven by rising tem-
peratures as well as Arctic-specific “feedback loops” 
arising out of the precarious balance between water 
and ice. An increase in average annual temperature 
of just a fraction of one degree can transform highly 
reflective sea-ice into dark, heat-absorbing open 
water. The same increase can turn rock-hard, chemi-
cally stable permafrost into a decomposing, methane-
emitting morass of ancient plant material. In recent 
decades, average annual temperatures in Alaska and 
the western Canadian Arctic have increased by more 
than 3° Celsius.
In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
reported that the average extent of sea-ice cover in 
summer had declined by 15 to 20 percent over the 
previous three decades. The rate of ice-melt has accel-
erated since then, with a loss of one million square 
kilometers in 2007 alone. A complete, late summer 
melt-out of Arctic sea-ice could occur as early as 
2013. When that happens, Arctic waters will become 
navigable twelve months a year, since a complete melt 
will spell the end of the “multi-year” ice that, after 
surviving the summer, becomes thicker and harder as 
a result of the accretion of new ice and the leach-
ing out of sea-salt during the warming-and-cooling 
cycle. From that point onward, the Arctic Ocean will 
resemble the Baltic Sea, where ice-strengthened ships 
and icebreaker-escorted convoys can safely operate in 
winter. 
Economic Activity
The Arctic is rich in hydrocarbons, with the U.S. 
Geological Survey estimating that the region contains 
83 billion barrels of oil and 44 trillion cubic meters 
of natural gas. Most of the projected reserves are 
located in waters less than 500 meters deep and will 
likely fall within the uncontested jurisdiction of one 
or another Arctic Ocean coastal state.
As the ice melts, ships will increasingly be used to 
transport oil and gas from and through the Arctic. 
Ice-strengthened tankers are already moving liquified 
natural gas from northern Norway to the United 
States. Oil tankers entail particular risks, since Arctic 
ecosystems are exceedingly fragile, oil degrades and 
dissipates very slowly at cold temperatures, and long 
distances would render cleanup efforts expensive and 
time-consuming. 
Other forms of shipping will also be attracted by 
the open water and thinner, softer ice. The Northwest 
Passage offers a 7000 kilometer shortcut between 
East Asia and the Atlantic Seaboard of the United 
States, as compared with the usual route through 
the Panama Canal. The Northern Sea Route along 
the coast of Russia offers a similar shortcut between 
East Asia and Europe, while a third option—sailing 
straight across the middle of the Arctic Ocean—
would cut the distance from East Asia to Europe in 
half.
Each summer now, hundreds of cruise ships visit 
Greenland. Dozens enter the Canadian Arctic while a 
few travel to the geographic North Pole. Adventurers 
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are also heading north in growing numbers, some 
of them sailing small boats through the Northwest 
Passage. Search-and-rescue officials in Denmark, 
Canada and the United States are concerned because 
these are remote, incompletely charted and some-
times stormy waters.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
spent years negotiating an Arctic Code for shipping, 
but the document was downgraded to a set of guide-
lines before it was adopted in 2002. In 2009, the 
Arctic Council released the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment which highlighted the environmental 
risks, especially from oil spills, but also from “ship 
strikes on marine mammals, the introduction of alien 
species, disruption of migratory patterns of marine 
mammals and anthropogenic noise produced from 
marine shipping activity.” The Assessment urged 
Arctic countries to liaise with international organi-
zations, promote the development and mandatory 
application of the IMO guidelines, and harmonize 
domestic safety regimes. It also, importantly, recom-
mended the development of “a comprehensive, multi-
national Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) instrument, 
including aeronautical and maritime SAR, among the 
eight Arctic nations.”
Security
Despite the Arctic’s Cold War history, the most sig-
nificant security threats are found along its southern 
fringes, in the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea 
Route. They involve non-state actors such as drug 
smugglers, gunrunners, illegal immigrants and even 
terrorists who might take advantage of ice-free Arctic 
waters to move contraband or people between the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans or into North America or 
Europe.
The non-state threats have attracted the attention 
of Arctic countries, not all of which are equipped 
to address the challenge. Canada, which has a small 
fleet of old and relatively small icebreakers, plans to 
construct six ice-strengthened patrol ships for its navy 
and a new icebreaker for its coastguard. Denmark 
and Norway already possess a few ice-strengthened 
frigates. The U.S. Coastguard has three icebreakers, 
two of which are quite old, and has recently deployed 
smaller, non-ice-strengthened vessels to northern 
Alaska in summer. Russia is by far the best equipped 
of the Arctic countries, with several dozen icebreak-
ers, some of which are nuclear-powered. 
The United States and Russia continue to deploy 
nuclear submarines in northern waters. Two U.S. 
submarines conducted communications tests off the 
north coast of Alaska in early 2009, while Russia’s 
Northern fleet is based in the Arctic Ocean port 
of Murmansk which, thanks to the Gulf Stream, 
is ice-free throughout the year. Both countries also 
deploy military aircraft over that ocean, with one 
exercise—by two Russian bombers in February 
2009—prompting a public expression of concern 
from Canada’s defense minister. 
American and Russian responses to the Cana-
dian minister were, however, even more telling. 
The four-star U.S. general in charge of NORAD 
assured journalists that the Russians had “conducted 
themselves professionally” and not entered Canadian 
or U.S. airspace, while a Russian diplomat explained 
that NORAD had been notified of the flights in 
advance, in accordance with a long-standing agree-
ment between Washington and Moscow.
The public rebuke was indicative of the impor-
tance placed on improved U.S.-Russian relations by 
the Obama Administration. President Obama has 
taken risks to promote that relationship, unilaterally 
revoking plans for U.S. missile defense installations 
in Europe and becoming the first American president 
to chair a meeting of the UN Security Council. The 
gamble has paid off, so far, with a unanimous resolu-
tion recommitting all five “declared nuclear weapon 
states” to negotiate towards the elimination of their 
nuclear arsenals. The table is now set for the 2010 
Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, with Obama’s expressed goal being complete 
nuclear disarmament. With so much at stake, Cana-
dian interference will not be tolerated. One can hope 
that Ottawa heard the message, and will now contrib-
ute positively to Washington’s efforts, most obviously 
by engaging Moscow cooperatively on Arctic issues.
International Law
The U.S.-Russian notification agreement is one 
thread in a web of international law that is pulling 
the Arctic towards greater cooperation. A particularly 
important role is played by the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
For unlike the Antarctic, a continent surrounded 
by oceans, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by 
continents. UNCLOS has been ratified by four of 
the five countries that border the Arctic Ocean, while 
the United States accepts the relevant provisions as 
customary international law.
With the exception of hans Island, a tiny 
outcrop between Greenland and Canada, there are 
no disputes over land territory in the Arctic. No 
country will ever “own” the geographic North Pole, 
which is located roughly 400 nautical miles to the 
north of Greenland, Canada’s Ellesmere Island, and 
the Russian archipelago of Franz Josef Land. Coastal 
states do not possess full sovereignty beyond the 12 
mile territorial sea.
however, coastal states do have certain sovereign 
rights out to 200 miles and sometimes farther. Under 
Article 76 of UNCLOS, they may claim rights over 
an “extended continental shelf ” if the depth and 
shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying 
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sediments indicate a “natural prolongation” of the 
shelf closer inshore. On the basis of what little we 
know about the Arctic Ocean so far, it is possible that 
either Russia, Denmark or Canada will be able to sci-
entifically demonstrate that the seabed at the North 
Pole is a natural prolongation of its continental shelf. 
If so, the country in question will have the exclusive 
right to exploit the resources of that area of seabed 
and nothing more. The water and sea-ice will remain 
part of the high seas.
Regardless of what happens at the North Pole, 
the sheer size of the Arctic Ocean and the lengths of 
uncontested coastlines mean that Russia will likely 
have sovereign rights over an expanse of seabed larger 
than Western Europe. Canada, with the world’s 
longest coastline, will also have a sizable extended 
continental shelf, as will the United States. Coun-
tries that do not border on the Arctic Ocean might 
feel left out, but because UNCLOS applies globally, 
many have the opportunity to assert similar rights 
along their coastlines.
Apart from the technical exercise of collecting and 
assessing the scientific evidence, the only significant 
issue concerns overlaps between claims. Overlaps can 
occur where there are disputed maritime boundaries 
closer inshore, since the dividing line beyond 200 
miles is usually simply an extension from the starting 
point. Disputes of this kind exist between Canada 
and the United States in the Beaufort Sea and 
Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. Depending on 
the scientific evidence, an overlap is also conceivable 
between Russian, Canadian, and Danish claims in 
the central Arctic Ocean.
Article 76 requires that scientific evidence of 
a natural prolongation be submitted to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
for review and recommendations. But the Commis-
sion will not issue recommendations with respect to 
overlapping claims. It is up to the countries involved 
to negotiate a solution, refer the matter to an inter-
national court or tribunal, or simply agree to disagree 
and not issue exploration licenses for the contested 
area.
In response to widespread misreporting about the 
possibility of conflict over seabed resources, Denmark 
hosted a summit of the Arctic Ocean coastal states 
at Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008. The summit 
culminated with all five countries reaffirming their 
commitment to resolving disputes peacefully within 
the existing framework of international law. Coopera-
tion on seabed mapping has accelerated since then, 
with Canadian and U.S. icebreakers working together 
in the Beaufort Sea, and diplomats from the five 
countries discussing the possibility of coordinated 
claims in the central Arctic Ocean. This approach, 
which would essentially create a negotiated set of 
boundaries, deserves the strongest possible support.
International law is also central to the U.S.-Can-
ada dispute over the status of the Northwest Passage. 
Ottawa regards the channels between its 19,000 
Arctic islands as “internal waters” which foreign 
vessels require permission to enter and where the full 
force of Canadian domestic law applies. Washington 
considers the waterway an “international strait” open 
to ships from any country almost without constraint. 
The two countries agreed-to-disagree in 1988, 
concluding a treaty on coastguard icebreaker transits 
that was explicitly without prejudice to their respec-
tive legal positions. Today, with the sea-ice melting 
and the prospect of numerous foreign vessels sailing 
through, the environmental protection and security 
interests of both Canada and the United States point 
in the direction of further negotiations.
In 2005, then U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci 
asked the State Department to re-examine the United 
States’ legal position concerning the Northwest 
Passage. After his term in Ottawa was over, Cellucci 
made his personal views clear, stating: “It is in the 
security interests of the United States that it [the 
Passage] be under the control of Canada.” 
Official policy, however, remains stuck in the pre-
climate change, pre-9/11 era, when thick, hard sea-ice 
could be relied upon to keep foreign vessels away, 
and concerns about a precedent that might negatively 
affect U.S. navigation interests elsewhere, such as in 
the Strait of Malacca, weighed heavier than threats 
from non-state actors and WMD. The concerns 
about a negative precedent were always exaggerated, 
because the presence of multi-year ice and paucity 
of foreign transits enable the Northwest Passage 
to be legally distinguished from other potential or 
existing international straits. however, the ability of 
the United States to change its policy and rely upon 
the Canadian position could soon disappear. As the 
ice melts, every summer brings a heightened risk of 
a challenge to Canada’s legal claim: most likely by 
a cargo ship owned by a rogue shipping company 
flying a flag of convenience and seeking to take a 
7000 kilometer short-cut, without consideration for 
the opinions—and future interests—of Canada and 
the United States.
International Institutions
Established in 1996, the Arctic Council is an inter-
governmental forum for promoting cooperation 
among the Arctic countries on non-military matters. 
It also includes several transnational indigenous 
groups as “permanent participants.” The Arctic 
Council should be the principal focus for north-
ern diplomacy, but some of its own members seem 
opposed to this. In May 2008, Denmark invited the 
Arctic Ocean coastal states to Ilulissat without also 
inviting Finland, Iceland and Sweden. In April 2009, 
Canada moved to deny “observer” status to China 
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and the European Union, in retaliation for an EU 
ban on the importation of seal products.
The International Maritime Organization should 
be leading efforts to regulate Arctic shipping, but the 
divergent interests of coastal and shipping states have 
slowed its progress. The 2002 Arctic Code is useful 
as a guideline for domestic legislators and a possible 
template for an eventual treaty. Other IMO treaties 
that are not specific to the Arctic, such as the 1988 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, also apply 
there, and ensure that the Arctic Ocean is no less 
regulated than the other, ice-free oceans.
Fortunately, a great deal of work has already been 
done by the United Nations. When UNCLOS was 
negotiated during the early 1980s, the Arctic was 
a focus of attention, as is evidenced by Article 234 
which enables coastal states to adopt stringent pol-
lution prevention measures in ice-covered regions. 
Article 76 on the extended continental shelf was also 
drafted with the Arctic in mind and is now, along 
with the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, providing an invaluable basis for 
dispute resolution and avoidance.
Indigenous Peoples
The inclusion of indigenous groups as permanent 
participants at the Arctic Council is a reflection of the 
important role played by northern peoples in diplo-
macy and international law-making. In Canada and 
Denmark, the traditional use and occupancy of land 
and ice by indigenous peoples constitutes an element 
of nation-state sovereignty claims. Some Arctic 
indigenous groups are transnational in character, with 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council representing the Inuit 
of Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Russia. The Inuit 
have been particularly influential on international 
environmental issues, providing an essential moral 
impetus during the negotiation of the 2001 Stock-
holm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
and helping to bring the Arctic dimension of climate 
change into the global public consciousness. In 2009, 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council issued “A Circumpo-
lar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.” 
The document does not claim Inuit sovereignty; 
rather, it asserts the right to be involved in any inter-
state negotiations concerning sovereignty disputes. 
Future Prospects
One occasionally hears talk of the need for an 
environmentally-oriented Arctic treaty modeled 
on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, or for an Arctic-wide 
nuclear weapons free zone. Achieving multilateral 
agreement on such matters would be difficult, given 
the continued strategic importance of the Arctic for 
the United States and Russia; the significant popula-
tions that live there, especially in Alaska and Russia; 
and the considerable jurisdiction already vested in the 
Arctic Ocean coastal states under the law of the sea. 
Fortunately, a great deal of cooperation already exists 
in the Arctic, as manifest in UNCLOS and a wide 
range of other treaties. The few remaining bound-
ary disputes are relatively minor and susceptible to 
negotiated solutions.
Much of the cooperation is based on the sovereign 
rights that Arctic countries hold over their territory, 
adjoining waters, and continental shelf. This should 
come as no surprise, for the international legal system 
is the result of centuries of cooperation between sov-
ereigns, as countries defined the boundaries between 
their respective jurisdictions and worked together in 
pursuit of common goals. In the Arctic, sovereign 
rights can facilitate cooperation by providing clear 
jurisdiction for regulating shipping and the extraction 
of natural resources, and for guarding against non-
state security threats. 
That said, the dominant challenge in the Arctic is 
climate change, which requires concerted and urgent 
cooperation elsewhere. Any excitement about Arctic 
oil and gas must be tempered by the realization that 
these prospects have arisen only because we have 
consumed so much oil and gas already. Exploiting 
Arctic hydrocarbons could exacerbate a global crisis 
that already imperils much of what we hold dear. 
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